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Smallholders suffer from low 
marketable surplus, poor holding 
capacity, low bargaining power 
and huge transaction cost 
in marketing their produce. 
Agricultural markets in India 
have been subject to reform 
processes with the stated 
intention of improving market 
access and participation for 
the primary producers. The 
three legislations introduced 
in 2020 are the latest in that 
direction. This article critically 
analyses market reforms in India 
with respect to smallholders’ 
bargaining position. It also 
provides insights on the ways 
and means to improve market 
participation and the bargaining 
position of smallholders. 
A griculture in developing countries is characterised by the predomi- nance of smallholders, and India 
is no exception. Small and marginal hold-
ings account for 86.08% of the total op-
erational holdings and 46.94% of the to-
tal operated area in the country (GoI 
2019a). The data on ownership holding 
for the country also refl ects this, with 
85.41% of total ownership holding under 
marginal and small category covering 
about 53.28% of the total area owned 
(NSSO 2013). The 126 million marginal 
and small famers, operating on an aver-
age size of holding of 0.6 hectares (ha), 
accounts for roughly about 40% of the 
total marketable surplus (GoI 2017). 
The earnings of a farmer are deter-
mined by the fi rst point of sale. The tra-
ditional marketing channels in India are 
state, cooperative and private trade. The 
total number of agricultural markets in 
India is 28,994, comprising 7,190 regu-
lated markets and 22,505 rural primary 
markets (GoI 2011). The regulated agri-
cultural markets cater to about two-fi fths 
of the marketed farm produce. Pattern 
of market access across major crops shows 
small and marginal farmers to have poor 
access to regulated markets (Sharma and 
Wardhan 2015). The low market density 
resulting in highly fragmented markets 
for agricultural commodities is a major 
constraining factor. The development of 
market infrastructure in the country has 
not been in tandem with the demand for 
markets. The National Commission on 
Farmers (NCF) of 2004 had recommended 
availability of regulated markets within a 
radius of 5 kilometre (km), with an aver-
age coverage area of 80 square kilometre 
(sq km). The current coverage of regu-
lated markets ranges from 114 sq km in 
Chandigarh to 11,215 sq km in Meghalaya, 
with an all-India average of 496 sq km 
(GoI 2019b). To meet the NCF standards, 
the country would need 41,000 re-
gulated markets compared to the 
current 7,190. 
The smallholders face high transaction 
cost in marketing their produce, owing 
to low marketable surplus, low market 
density and poor connectivity to mar-
kets. The transaction costs are location-, 
farm- and crop-specifi c (Pingali and 
Aiyar 2019). High cost of market access 
cum participation and the low holding 
capacity of smallholders results in a 
large majority of their marketable surplus 
being sold at the farm gate to traders and 
village merchants (NSSO 2014). The trans-
action cost, coupled with the asymmetry 
in market information and poor holding 
capacity, leads to huge differences in 
the price realised by the smallholders 
relative to large farmers and across 
geographies. Price dispersion1 at farm 
gate was observed to be in the range of 
one to fi ve across select foodgrains and 
oilseeds with the lowest and highest dis-
persion observed in tur and groundnut, 
respectively (MoF 2016). 
Smallholder farmers operate within 
this unequal exchange relations in agri-
cultural markets. Owing to their poor 
bargaining capacity, the price realised 
by the smallholder at the farm gate is the 
lowest competitive price (Pingali and 
Aiyar 2019). This is the case even for 
those commodities with price support. On 
the other hand, large farmers received the 
same price from all the agencies, refl ect-
ing their better bargaining capacity 
(Sharma and Wardhan 2015). Low prices 
translate into low revenues from sale of 
agricultural produce, eventually resulting 
in low and unstable farm income. Given 
the unequal exchange relations in agri-
cultural markets, smallholders are con-
strained to realise higher revenues from 
market transactions, even in the event of 
a good agricultural season. In addition, 
interlocking of the credit outputs, inputs 
and outputs due to dependence on market 
intermediaries for credit and input 
support, tie the smallholders with their 
lenders. This limits their opportunity to 
avail the multiple channels for market-
ing and reap a higher share in the con-
sumer rupee. Thus, market risks are as 
crucial as production risk for viability of 
smallholder livelihoods. 
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Integration of smallholders with market 
is seen as the means for better price reali-
sation and improved income for small-
holders (Pingali and Aiyar 2019). Gov-
ernment of India (GoI), since 2017, rec-
ognises the centrality of commodity 
marketing and its role in contributing to 
doubling farmers’ income by 2022–23 
(GoI 2017). Marketing is identifi ed as a 
priority intervention in transforming ag-
riculture into sustainable agribusiness. 
Agricultural marketing has witnessed a 
series of reforms over the past decades 
with the intention of making it competi-
tive and inclusive. The three farm bills 
tabled in Parliament in September 2020, 
which are now acts are the latest in this 
direction. 
The reforms in agricultural marketing 
and the protest and criticisms against 
them are all played out in the name of the 
farmers. But farmers are not a homo-
geneous community. They differ in their 
resource capacities and ability to access 
and participate in market. Given the enor-
mity of smallholders in agricultural sector 
and almost two-fi fths of the marketable 
surplus coming from them, it is impor-
tant to understand the impact of market 
reforms on them. In this context, the 
position of the smallholder with respect 
to these market reforms needs a nuanced 
understanding. This article is an attempt 
to critically analyse the market reforms in 
agriculture from a smallholder perspec-
tive. It tries to explore if the agricultural 
market reforms in India accommodate or 
bypass the smallholders. In the process, 
the article provides insights on improving 
market participation and the bargaining 
position of smallholders. 
Need for Reforms 
The Agricultural Produce Marketing Reg u-
lation (APMR) Act which came into effect 
in the 1960s is a landmark in agricultur-
al marketing in India. This act implement-
ed by various states in India has its ori-
gin in the Model Bill introduced in 1938, 
based on the recommendation of the 
Royal Commission on Agriculture. The 
implementation of APMR Act led to the 
creation of the agricultural produce mar-
ket committees (APMCs) and the begin-
ning of regulated organised marketing in 
agriculture2 (GoI 2009). This was heralded 
as an institutional innovation to protect 
the interest of the farmer against low 
prices, loss of produce and high marketing 
costs. However, over the years, the mar-
ket regulation, the Essential Commodities 
Act and various other regulations passed 
by the state and central government cur-
tailed the development of a free and com-
petitive marketing system. Eventually, the 
institutional mechanism created to pro-
tect the interest of the farmers regressed 
into an exp loitative regime. APMC gradu-
ally lost its democratic nature, licensing 
mandates for trading encouraged rent-
seeking beh aviour and unfair competition 
stifl ing entry of new entrepreneurs. The 
key issues with regulated markets were 
the (i) licensing bottlenecks, (ii) exorbi-
tant market charges, (iii) poor state of 
market infrastructure, and (iv) long sup-
ply chain and low remuneration to farm-
ers. The other concerns relate to lack of 
transparency, domination by political 
parties in APMC and asymmetry in mar-
ket information (GoI 2013). 
Thus, market regulation instead of 
facilitating effi cient marketing practices 
benefi ting farmers was stifl ing the very 
spirit of competitive functioning. Mono-
polistic practices in APMC and excessive 
state control discouraged private invest-
ment in the sector and free trade of agri-
cultural commodities across and within 
states. The mandatory requirement of 
owning a shop/godown space within the 
regulated market for obtaining lic ense to 
trade and the lack of space to construct 
new shops in the APMC yards, act as 
barriers for entry of new entrepreneurs. 
Further, licensed traders and commis-
sion agents organised themselves into 
associations and barred the entry of new 
entrepreneurs (GoI 2013). Owing to long 
supply chains and large number of inter-
mediaries in the chain, the producers 
share in consumer’s price is very low. It 
is estimated to be in the range of 32% to 
68% in the case of perishables like fruits 
and vegetables, while in paddy, it is in 
the range of 56%  to 89%, and for wheat, 
it ranges from 77% to 88% (GoI 2013).
Past Attempts at Reforms 
The fi rst attempt at reforming the APMC 
Act was through the introduction of the 
model APMC Act in 2003, based on the 
recommendations of the expert commi-
ttee in 2001 and the Inter-Ministerial 
Task Force in 2002 (GoI 2013). The model 
APMC Act stipulates: (i) private yards, 
direct purchase centres for direct sales, 
(ii) public private partnership for agricul-
tural market development, (iii) special 
market for perishables, (iv) provision for 
regulating and promoting contract farm-
ing, and (v) prohibition of commission 
agents in transaction of agricultural pro-
duce with the traders. The model act 
aims to redefi ne the role of APMCs and 
state agricultural marketing boards to 
promote standardisation, grading, qua-
lity certifi cation, etc. Selective provisions 
under the model APMC Act were adopted 
by a few states, however, the pace of re-
forms was slow. Several states have dere-
gulated fruits and vegetables from the pur-
view of APMC. 
Subsequently, the government set up 
the Empowered Committee of State Mini-
sters in-charge of Agricultural Marketing 
on 2 March 2010. The committee was to 
persuade states to adopt the model APMC 
Act and Rules, suggest measures for pro-
motion of barrier-free national markets 
in agriculture, effi cient dissemination of 
agricultural information and promote 
grading, standardi sing, packaging and 
certifi cation. The committee had put out 
detailed recommendations on: (i) reforms 
to agricultural markets, (ii) promotion of 
investment in marketing infrastructure 
development, (iii) rationalisation of mar-
keting fee/commission agents, (iv) con-
tract far ming, (v) barrier free markets, 
(vi) market information system (vii) grad-
ing and standardisation, and (viii) on 
farmer producer organisation’s (FPO) 
and GoI’s import–export policy for agri-
cultural produce (GoI 2013). 
To promote direct sale by farmers to 
consumers, GoI launched a programme 
to develop and upgrade the rural haats 
to Gramin Agricultural Markets (GrAMs) 
(GoI 2019b). Owing to the barriers of  entry 
and the huge transaction cost of tran sport-
ing to market yards, the propor tion of the 
marketable surplus of wheat and paddy 
that gets traded at the APMC mandis are 
reported to be low (NSSO 2014). The rural 
haats located in interior areas serve as a 
focal point for small and marginal farmers 
who are constrained to access centrally 
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located APMC mandis. They contribute 
41% of the total marketable surplus in ag-
ricultural produce (GoI 2017). Almost 90% 
of the marketable surplus of the resource 
poor farmers are sold in rural haats. The 
GrAMs initiative provides a viable alter-
native to APMC mandis and facilitates 
direct market participation by farmers 
resulting in better price realisation. 
The latest attempt aimed at removing 
trade barriers and entry restrictions in 
agricultural marketing is the launch of 
NAM—National Agriculture Market—a 
pan-India electronic trading portal in 2015 
(NABARD 2018). The e-NAM portal creates 
a unifi ed national market for agricultural 
commodities by networking the exist-
ing APMC mandis. e-NAM is expe cted to 
address the issues of physical entry 
barriers for trade and information asym-
metry between buyers and sellers. As on 
17 June 2018, 585 regulated markets 
across 16 states and two union terri tories 
have been integrated via e-NAM, 1.05 crore 
farmers have registered on the e-NAM 
portal, out of which 45.25 lakh farmers 
have traded on the platform. The num-
ber is growing and as on 31 October 
2020, the e-NAM portal has 1.68 crore 
registered farmers, 1,798 FPOs and 1.50 
lakh traders. The platform has handled 
agricultural trade worth `91,000 crore 
since its inception.
Farm Acts 2020: Provisions 
The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Com-
merce (Promotion and Facilitation) Act, 
2020 (APMC Deregulation Act) modifi es 
how APMCs function and brings in key 
changes like: (i) removal of interstate and 
intrastate barriers in trade of agricultur-
al commodities; (ii) trading in all agri-
cultural commodities (not only fruits 
and vegetables) outside the APMC yards; 
(iii) ban on APMCs levying cess or market 
fee for trading outside designated market 
yards by farmers or traders; (iv) doing 
away with the mandatory licence for oper-
ating e-trading platforms; and (v) relaxing 
e-trading norms and allowing FPOs or any 
other organisation or individual with a 
PAN to engage in e-trading (MoAFW 2020). 
The Farmers (Empowerment and Pro-
tection) Agreement of Price Assurance 
and Farm Services Act, 2020 (Contract 
Farming Act) intents to provide an 
enabling framework for contract farm-
ing.3 The key changes proposed  towards 
this are: (i) written agreement between 
the farmer and the buyer to be made be-
fore start of season; (ii) mandatory re-
quirement to mention “guaranteed price,” 
agreement to be registered with the re-
spective state registration authority; 
(iii) full payment at time of delivery; 
(iv) provision against liability from crop 
loss due to natural calamity and insect and 
pest attack for farmers; and (v) decentral-
ised dispute settlement. 
Essential Commodities (Amendment) 
Act, 2020 (Amendment of Essential Com-
modities Act, 1955) relaxes regulation 
and stock limits for notifi ed commodi-
ties: (i) regulation of food items only un-
der extraordinary conditions (famine, 
natural calamity, extraordinary price 
rise); and (ii) stock limit will not apply to 
processors and others at the higher end 
of the agricultural value chain under 
certain conditions. Stocks for public dis-
tribution system (PDS) and targeted pub-
lic distribu tion system (TPDS) exempt 
from ceilings.
The justifi cation for the “APMC Dereg-
ulation Act” is to address issues pla guing 
the regulated APMC market systems—an 
institutional mechanism created in the 
1960s to protect the interest of farmers. 
In principle, this bill aims to bring in 
seamless markets for agricultural produce 
across the country—“One Nation, One 
Market,” enables farmers to sell their 
produce to anyone they wish and attract 
corporate investments in agri-marketing 
infrastructure and services. 
However, past attempts at reforming 
APMC by states have had a mixed impact. 
Bihar repealed its APMC Act in 2006, but 
it did not have the desired benefi t in 
terms of competitive market opportuni-
ties and better price realisation for farm-
ers (as they continue selling to local 
traders); instead it seems to have bene-
fi ted large wholesalers and fl our mills 
with no benefi t to farmers. Madhya 
Pradesh reformed its APMC regulation but 
retained many of its key features. The 
reforms in APMC regulation led to the 
entry of large corporates in commodity 
procurement (for example, ITC) and were 
complemented by an enhanced role for 
cooperative banks in providing inputs 
and credit (Kapur and Krishnamurthy 
2014). It helped break the credit–output 
market nexus through which traders and 
commission agents exercised control over 
farmers’ produce, for medium to large 
farmers. However, small farmers con-
tinue to be dependent on traders, commis-
sion agents and moneylenders for credit, 
leading to interlocking of credit and 
commodity markets.4 In such a scenario, 
smallholder farmers have limited chances 
of benefi ting from competitive prices from 
alternate channels. 
Another area of concern is price dis-
covery. At present, APMC serves as an 
important mechanism for price signal 
both to farmers and policymakers. This 
is despite APMCs receiving only about 
two-fi fths of the total marketable surplus. 
Deregulation is likely to further reduce 
volume of trade happening in APMCs, 
with APMCs losing their relevance in set-
ting reference price. In the absence of a 
source of price signal, smallholders will 
be shortchanged by colluding traders in 
their localised bargaining islands. Fur-
ther, the absence of concrete mechanism 
for collecting and publishing data (beyond 
APMCs) on market arrivals, trade volume 
and prices in denotifi ed trade areas 
will eventually lead to invisibility and 
opaqueness in a market where there is a 
tremendous difference in negotiation pow-
er and capital among buyers and sellers. 
Thus, the farm bills are expe cted to in-
crease information asymmetries, con-
tributing to greater exploitation and in-
equities for the majority of India’s small-
holder farmers. 
The contract farming bill, in principle, 
aims to provide a favourable arrange-
ments for farmers through provision of 
guaranteed price, protection against liabi-
lity in the event of crop losses and full 
payment at time of delivery. However, 
despite these aims, the Contract Farming 
Bill is unlikely to create a spurt in contracts 
from private players. So far, contract 
farming in India has been limited to few 
niches, such as potatoes for chips produc-
tion, vegetables for certain supermarket 
chains, or gherkins for export markets. 
Key challenges in growth of contract 
farming are related to ground realities 
of agriculture in India, even more so 
than the regulatory framework. The 
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small size of holdings in India discour-
ages agribusiness from entering into con-
tracts directly with farmers and instead 
preferring contracts with traders/inter-
mediaries who aggregate the farmers’ pro-
duce (Singh 2012). Enforcement and dis-
pute resolution issues have led to “loose 
arrangements” which might more accu-
rately be called “contact farming” where 
some conditions of production and pricing 
are specifi ed by buyers without entering 
into any formal contract. Further, in the 
absence of a stipulated guideline for es-
timating “minimum guaranteed price” 
there are chances of prices being fi xed 
too low to be  remunerative for farmers. 
Amendments to the Essential Commo-
dities Act, 1955 aim to incentivise large 
private investment in storage infrastruc-
ture, processing and value addition, and 
reduce post-harvest losses due to wastage. 
It gives legal right to corporates with 
deep pockets to stock commodities and 
reap the benefi ts of higher prices during 
off-season. It also reduces the govern-
ment’s ability to intervene in cases of 
hoarding- and speculation-led egregious 
increase in prices, as happened in the case 
of pulses 2015. It offers no benefi t to the 
resource poor producer or the consumer. 
The more than 80% smallholder produc-
ers are also net consumers and unfair 
trade practices have the potential of serv-
ing a double blow in terms of low farm 
gate price and high retail price of essen-
tial commodities. Doing away with export 
bans is likely to benefi t larger farmers 
engaged in exports of basmati rice and 
niche export-oriented commodities. 
The FPO related provisions in the act 
which allow FPOs to trade in all commodi-
ties and enter farming contracts are a 
welcome change. These provisions may 
benefi t FPOs of medium to large farmers 
and a handful of other well-connected 
FPOs, which have enough capital. How-
ever, it should be noted that the main 
hurdles facing FPOs today relate to access 
to working capital. Small farmer FPOs 
will be constrained to engage in con tract 
farming with its members,  unless there 
is signifi cant capital infusion. Further, 
the FPOs need to invest on building their 
capacities as agri-entrepreneurs to com-
pete with large private fi rms dealing in 
agricultural commodities. Thus there are 
a lot of challenges that have to be ad-
dressed before an FPO of smallholders 
plays a pivotal role in agricultural mar-
keting and contract farming. 
Overall, the three acts are aimed 
at removing “market bottlenecks” and 
creating “market effi ciencies.” However, 
it is pertinent to note that Indian agri-
culture production and market system 
operates at the interface of informal and 
formal economy, with the majority of 
farmers operating less than one hectare of 
land, producing limited surplus for mar-
kets and thus requiring multiple layers of 
intermediaries for aggregation, market-
ing and primary value addition (grading, 
sorting, etc). Addressing current market 
ineffi ciencies and inequities requires a 
surgical approach rather than large-scale 
deregulation introduced through the farm 
bills. Taken together, the three farm bills 
are likely to lead to the emergence of 
non-state local and  regional monop-
sonies or oligopolistic cartels in agricul-
tural trading. And,  given the difference 
in market power of small producers rela-
tive to traders and corporations, the bills 
are also likely to shift more risk to the 
smallholder producers over time.5 
Strategies for Improvement 
The poor bargaining position of the 
smallholders and the factors constraining 
their participation has policy implications 
in terms of technological, infrastructur-
al and institutional innovations in agri-
culture marketing. Some of the key poli-
cy measures that would improve small-
holder competitiveness and market par-
ticipation are discussed in this section. 
Coexistence of regulated and open 
markets: The reforms should pave the 
way for coexistence of an effi cient APMC 
system with private trading in agricul-
tural commodities. Experiences from 
Bihar post the repealing of APMC Act in 
2006 and the state of market infrastruc-
ture and effi ciency of price discovery by 
farmers in Kerala, Mani pur, and those 
union territories which do not have 
APMC Act, need to be factored in while 
implementing the reforms. Given the 
heterogeneity of the agricultural produc-
tion systems and market dynamics, barrier 
free trading to be competitive and results 
in better price discovery need to be com-
plemented with the presence of a vibrant 
and strong APMC system. 
A study done across 14 states on the 
impact of APMC Acts and Rules on agri-
cultural growth and poverty outcomes 
over a 40-year period show that states 
with improved regulatory arrangements 
in the agricultural market are the ones 
with higher investment in agriculture, 
improved productivity and better poverty 
reduction outcomes (Purohit et al 2017). 
This substantiates the argument that 
in order to protect the interest of the 
farmers’ coexistence of APMC with private 
trading, rather than an either-or scenario 
is the most benefi cial. Hence, efforts at 
infrastructural upgradation and govern-
ance reforms in APMC need to be carried 
out with renewed zeal as the country 
braces for seamless trading in agricul-
tural commodities. 
Strengthening FPOs and farmers’ col-
lectives: The farm bills open more ave-
nues for FPOs to engage in trading and 
enter into contracts with corporate buy-
ers. FPOs can also, to some extent, cor-
rect information asymmetry in agricul-
tural marketing. Capacity building of 
FPOs on entrepreneurship and agribusi-
ness development could go a long way to 
help farmer enterprises to play a bigger 
role in the fi eld of agricultural market-
ing. The FPOs could also engage in mutu-
ally benefi cial contract farming arrange-
ments with its members. Building the 
capacity of FPOs as agri-entrepreneurs 
will help them compete with private 
players in the fi eld. Further, there should 
be a mechanism to address the capital 
and infrastructural requirement of the 
FPOs if they are to emerge as drivers of 
agricultural marketing in India. 
Creating storage and processing in-
frastructure close to farm gate: Study 
on marketable surplus by Sharma and 
Wardhan (2015) has shown the marketed 
surplus of smallholders to be higher than 
the marketable surplus, clearly indicating 
distress sale by smallholders. This indi-
cates lack of holding capacity of small-
holders owing to poor storage infr astruc-
ture. Creating decentralised storage and 
quality control infrastructure at village 
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cluster level will improve the holding ca-
pacity of the farmer, improving their 
bargaining capacity with res pect to time 
and location of sale, leading to better 
price realisation. Low-capital processing 
facilities can also bring price realisation 
benefi ts. This will require  developing 
new models for the role of panchayati raj 
institutions or FPOs in operationalising 
such infrastructure. New models for 
funding such infrastructure also need to 
evolve, such as, leveraging existing gov-
ernment schemes supplemented by phil-
anthropic/corporate social responsibility 
investments.
Market intelligence systems: Market in-
formation plays a crucial role in increas-
ing market participation of small-
holders. They are dependent on the trad-
ers for price and market information. 
APMCs with their role in price signalling, 
formed the backbone of agriculture 
market intelligence system of the country. 
However, with the new reforms, as a 
greater proportion of trade shifts from 
APMCs towards private arrangements, 
information from APMCs will become less 
representative of agriculture markets. 
Developing market intelligence system 
and tools that will cater to the needs of 
resource-poor farmers have the potential 
to correct some of the issues of asymme-
try in market information. Information 
and communication technology-based 
platforms could be used for wider dis-
semination and reach.
 
Facilitating access to institutional 
credit: A vast majority of the smallhold-
ers are excluded from the institutional 
credit network. They depend on the 
traders and local commission agents for 
credit. This leads to interlocking of the 
credit-output, credit-input and input–
outputs resulting in tied markets. Hence, 
efforts at improving smallholder bar-
gaining capacity need to be comple-
mented with efforts at fi nancial inclu-
sion to enable them to choose from the 
multiple marketing channels.
Conclusions 
Market reforms, including the new market 
reforms in the form of the three legisla-
tion, are expected to increase the precarity 
of the smallholders that include small and 
marginal farmers and women farmers, 
especially in the rain-fed areas. If farm-
ing is to be a viable livelihood  option for 
millions of small and marginal farmers, the 
government and social sector would need 
to invest in creating mechanisms to foster 
greater inclusion and equity in market 
access and safeguard against potential 
exploitation. Understanding market-access 
requires smallholders’ perspective of 
trading of surplus, interlocking of trade 
with other markets via credit and trans-
action costs associated with small sur-
plus, distress sale due to compelling re-
quirements of cash in hand, and nature 
and type of  agricultural commodities 
produced and sold by them. This would 
provide a comprehensive understanding 
on the need for market-access and mar-
ket participation enhancing reforms for 
the diverse agricultural commodities 
produced by smallholder farmers.
Notes
1  Price dispersion is measured as the ratio of the 
highest price and the lowest price for a crop in 
the country a during the reference marketing 
period. The ratio equal to one indicates no 
price dispersion and one uniform price across 
geographies or one common market. 
2  Kerala, Manipur, Bihar and union territories 
except Chandigarh do not have an APMC Act. 
In Sikkim, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, 
APMC is not implemented. 
3  Several states already have contract farming 
bills in place, with varying provisions.
4  Institutional credit system covers roughly 65% 
of the farmers and large majority of the small-
holders are excluded from it.
5  Concerns about dismantling of MSP and the 
government procurement system which sup-
ports the PDS has not been dealt with in this 
paper as it was not felt relevant to the central 
argument in the article. 
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